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Graciela Chichilnisky
Columbia University, New York (NY)
1 . - Introduction: Trading Blocs and GATT
Regional free trade zones have been unexpectedly successful in
the last decade. Since 1980 the European Community enlarged
significantly its membership and its scope . It now includes southern
European countries, and market-integrating features allowing goods,
people, services and capital to flow freely around an area accounting
for about one fourth of world economic output .
In what appears to be a strategic response, the US has been
activated to enter into similar agreements with its neighbors . The
recent trading and investment agreement with Canada was signed
after many decades of doubtful consideration, and the trend is
expanding to the rest of the Americas starting with Mexico . The final
points needed for the ratification of NAFTA are still undecided (1),
even though the US-Canada-Mexico treaty is already signed . This
trend is observed also in other regions . The six members of the
Association of South East Asian Nations - Singapore, Malaysia,
(*) This article was prepared for the United Nations Program of Trade Liberaliz-
ation in the Americas, ECLAC, Washington (DC).
(1) The US is currently in the process of imposing steel tariffs on a number of
countries including Canada, which is seeking exemption.
N. B . : the numbers in square brackets refer to the Bibliography at the end of the
paper.
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Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei - have begun this
year to build their Asean free trade area Afta as a future
counterweight to other international trading blocs, even though at
present most of their trade is with Europe, Japan and the US and not
with each other. The Japanese have increasingly focused their
economic attention in their own region, leading to more investment in
and imports from the new East Asian manufacturing exporters . Even
the Andean Pact seems to be progressing in Latin America after
several decades of aimless discussions, with Mercosur following suit.
While regional free trade agreements prosper, the negotiation
towards the liberalization of global trade are unsuccessful and stalling,
with the agricultural markets being a key negotiating problem . Little
goodwill has been generated from the GATT discussions, dispelling
hopes for a reversal of fortunes in the near future . While the nature of
the GATT negotiations is political, it is reasonable to seek explanations
for the situation from an economic viewpoint .
The contrast between the lackluster performance of GATT and
the success of the regional . trade pacts raises disparate reactions . One
view is that the emergence of regional trade pacts is a step in the right
direction. In this view free trade is not defunct, but rather being
organized and approached differently . But another, quite natural,
reaction is to fear that "customs unions", as regional free trade pacts
are usually called, are inherently opposed to global free trade . Do
customs unions increase free trade with insiders at the cost of
diverting trade with outsiders? Since the classic works of Meade [17]
and Viner [22] classifying the issues into trade creation and trade
diversion, there has been little conceptual advance on this issue . But
the issue is very alive today, and requires our full attention.
It is the purpose of this paper to re-examine the positive and
negative aspects of trading blocs as they relate to gains from free
trade . The paper is primarily a discussion of conceptual issues,
although it is based on facts and on particular cases which are of
interest to the trade liberalization in the Americas .
We take a somewhat different approach to a familiar issue .
Rather than asking the standard question of whether regional blocs
help or hinder global free trade, we ask a more detailed question :
what type of customs union is likely to lead to a trade war between the
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blocs, and what type of customs union is, instead, likely to lead to
expanded global trade . In practical terms: what type of trade policies
within the blocs will provide economic incentives for expanding free
trade .
We shall compare the impact on the world economy of free trade
blocs which are organized around two alternative principles : one is
traditional comparative advantages, the other is economies of scale .
The aim is to determine how the patterns of trade inside the blocs
determine the trade relations among the blocs.
The paper has four parts . Section 2 reviews the existing economics
of trading blocs, and uses this to explain the current situation in the EC
and NAFTA. Section 3 presents a new conceptual approach to the
economics of preferential trade, focusing on the internal organization
of the trading blocs and the economic incentives that this generates
with respect to the rest of the world . Section 4 is a conclusion which
pulls the arguments together for an evaluation of NAFTA and an
American free trade zone, and of global free trade. The last Section is
an Appendix which provides a formal general equilibrium model of
trading blocs with increasing returns to scale and proves the mathe-
matical results which underlie the discussion in the text .
2 . - The Economics of Trading Blocs
2 .1 Free Trade and Market Power
The last ten years have seen new developments in international
trade, focusing on the study of economic dynamics and of market
imperfections leading to strategic issues in game theory and industrial
organization . But the central tenet of the theory remains the Pareto
efficiency of the static and competitive world market. In competitive
markets, free trade leads to Pareto efficient allocations . There is no
way to make a someone better off without making someone else
worse off . This is a general proposition which holds for several
countries and several markets interacting with each other simultane-
ously . Called the first theorem of welfare economics, the result that
static competitive markets have Pareto efficient equilibria seems to
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loom the larger, the more special cases of market imperfections are
pointed out.
In view of the efficiency of competitive markets, the failure of
GATT to bring countries to an agreement about a world of free trade
seems, at first sight, irrational . It would appear that countries act as if
they could, but prefer not to, achieve a Pareto efficient allocation .
Indeed, some believe that the failure of GATT is simply a version of the
well-known prisoners' dilemma. The words "prisoners' dilemma" are
used to describe a generically inefficient situation, one which, with
appropriate coordination, can be altered so as to increase the welfare
of each and all players .
Such a view would be incorrect . GATT's problems derive not
from irrational behavior, nor from a lack of coordination or
"prisoners' dilemma". The reason is that while free trade in competi
tive markets leads to Pareto optimal solutions, free trade may not lead
to Pareto efficient allocations when the countries are large and have
market power. For example, large countries may freely choose the
quantities they export in order to manipulate to their- advantage world
market prices, in much the same way that a monopolist freely chooses
to supply a quantity that maximizes his profits considering its impact
on prices, inducing Pareto inferior allocations . For free trade to be
Pareto efficient markets must be competitive, and countries must
have no market power. When countries are sufficiently large to have
an impact on market prices, then they often have an incentive to
impose tariffs on each other .
Furthermore, under classical assumptions, a move from tariffs to
free trade will typically make some countries better off but other
countries worse off. It is true that if a competitive allocation were
reached, it would be Pareto efficient . But in a world with tariffs, as we
have today, under traditional assumptions some country will lose if
free trade is adopted .
One may ask why large countries have protectionist incentives?
The reason is that it is possible for large countries to improve their
welfare by improving their terms of trade. This is of course not true in
competitive markets where the traders, by definition, have no impact
on prices . But the theory of trade proves that under traditional
assumptions, a large country does have an economic incentive to
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impose tariffs on others . This is the standard theorem on the existence
of optimal tariffs, which is discussed in more detail in Section 3 .5
below. A tariff can improve the terms of trade of a large country, even
though it may distort its production and consumption . What the
theorem says is that, under traditional assumptions, there is always an
optimal tariff, one at which the gains from increasing its terms of
trade through tariffs exceeds the losses due to distortions . A textbook
analysis of a simple case is found for example in Krugman and Obsfelt
[15] . This theorem is widely accepted, understood and applied.
Of course, the argument in favor of optimal tariffs is not true for
small countries . It is essential that the country should be large enough
to have the ability to have an impact on prices . Furthermore the larger
the country, the more market power it has, and the more it can gain
from imposing tariffs on others . The implication of this is that if a
world of small competitive economies merges into a few trading blocs,
then under traditional assumptions, after the blocs are formed, there
are more incentives for imposing tariffs than before . In other words,
regional free trade associations, under traditional conditions, lead to
protectionism .
The optimal tariff which we have just discussed is imposed by one
country on others unilaterally . The theorem does not consider the
possibility of retaliation by other countries . But what if they retaliate?
What if other countries also impose tariffs in response?
We now move to a world of strategic considerations, a world with
tariff wars . Each county imposes tariffs on each other, and does so stra-
tegically so as to maximize its welfare given the actions of others . The
outcome of this tariff game was studied in Kennan and Riezman [ 12],
[13] . If each country chooses as its tariff the best response to the
others', a market equilibrium with tariffs is reached . We call this an op-
timal tariff equilibrium to distinguish it from the free trade equilibrium .
In an optimal tariff equilibrium some countries are better off than
they would be at a free trade equilibrium, Kennan and Riezman [12],
[13] and Riezman [21] . In other words, not all countries would benefit if
the world were to move from the optimal tariff equilibrium into a world
with free trade . Furthermore, these works show that the larger the
country, the more it can improve its welfare at the optimal tariff equilib-
rium from the level that it could achieve at a free trade equilibrium .
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To a certain extent the current situation in the world economy
can be described as an optimal tariff equilibrium . Each country
imposes tariffs on others strategically . In this light the difficulties of
GATT have a reasonable explanation . The unwillingness of countries
to agree to multilateral free trade is neither irrational nor a coordi-
nation problem . It is a rational response to economic incentives of
countries with market power.
One immediate implication is that, under traditional conditions,
regional trade blocs which increase the market power of the market
participants will naturally lead to tariff wars . The larger the market
power of a trade bloc, the greater is its incentive to impose tariffs on
others . Even after retaliatory moves are taken into account the same
proposition holds: the larger the market power of the bloc, the greater
is its possible gain from a tariff war. Therefore if the formation of
regional trade blocs increases the market power of the participants,
the creation of regional free trade zones encourages trade wars.
We have remarked that the results on optimal tariffs and on the
optimal tariffs equilibria hold under traditional assumptions . Since
each of these results predicts that regional free trade zones create
incentives against global free trade, it becomes crucial to examine the
role of these traditional assumptions closely . For whenever these
conditions are satisfied, regional free trade inevitably leads to trade
wars. And the larger the free trade zones, the more likely it is that they
will lead to trade wars.
We shall examine these conditions in some detail in the next
section . This examination will be conceptual,, but focused on par-
ticular cases of immediate interest . Drawing on the classical results on
tariffs of Lerner [16] and of Metzler [19], and on new results on
trading blocs with economies of scale Chichilnisky [9] reported also in
the Appendix, we shall show that if the blocs are organized internally
around the principle of economies of scale, the optimal tariff theorem
is defeated. This means that, under increasing returns conditions, it is
not true that a country is better off by the unilateral imposition of a
positive tariff on its imports . But before we turn to the new results, we
shall explore the implications of the optimal tariff theorem on the
European Community and on NAFTA.
We shall argue that trade patterns can be based on traditional
world economy
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comparative advantages or on economies of scale . It is to a large
extent a matter of policy choice . The trade policies within a trade bloc
determine the extent to which the trade bloc will aid or hinder global
free trade. The argument for this result, and its implications for trade
policy, will occupy the rest of this paper .
We now turn to the possible motivation for the US in forming a
free trade zone with its neighbors .
The argument uses simple strategic considerations based on the
results discussed in the previous section . NAFTA - and any further
extension to a larger free trade zone in the Americas, can be seen as a
strategic response by the US to the creation ,of the European Com-
munity trading bloc . The European Community bloc is a free trade
zone with a quarter of world output . In seeking to form a trading bloc
with its natural trading partners in the Americas, the US appears to
respond to the creation of more market power, with an attempt to
create more market power. This is a rational response if the US
expects a united Europe to impose tariffs on the rest of the world. The
emergence of a region with increased market power generally pro-
vides an incentive to other regions to seek similar status .
More explanatory power still can be extracted from the results of
Kennan and Riezman [12], [13] and Riezman [21] on who wins trade
wars. Following the creation of a customs union, the incentives are to
create or join another free trade zone, but not at random. The
economic incentive is to join another free trade zone with the largest
possible market power. This result allows us to predict that the US
should not only seek a free trade deal with Canada, but one with as
many countries in the Americas as possible . The aim is to reach
market power which exceeds that of a unified Europe .
2.3 Trade Creation and Diversion
Once a new free trade zone is created, how do we measure the
gains and losses from trade?
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A naive view is that since free trade in competitive markets is
Pareto efficient, any move towards free trade is positive . As we saw,
this would not be correct. We argued that regional trade blocs, being
larger than their components, will have more market power and
therefore an incentive to impose tariffs against outsiders under tradi-
tional conditions. Therefore one of the first negative effects of the
formation of a trading bloc is that it can hurt the countries outside
these areas. We shall argue below that these negative effects can be
mitigated if the trading patterns within the blocs are organized around
economies of scale .
But are the damages of free trade zones limited to protectionism
with the rest of the world? The answer to this question is generally no .
There is a second potential damage in the formation of regional trade
blocs . Even if the trading blocs are not accompanied by protectionism
against the rest of the world, they can still lead to trade diversions .
This means that a regional free trade bloc may lead to the wrong
specialization within the bloc. The classical argument about trade
diversion is found in Viner [22], whose work remains a benchmark of
analysis of preferential trade agreements. We shall summarize his
argument here in order to show that, if trading within the blocs is
organized around economies of scale, then Viner's argument can
break down. With economies of scale, the negative effect of trade
diversion can be mitigated . The empirical evidence discussed below
suggests that this is what has happened in the European Market since
1958.
The essential argument can be captured from the textbook
Table 1 :
THE EFFECTS OF TRADING BLOCS
TRADE DIVERSION
TABLE 1
Cost of veg. oil
Tariffs
8 I 12
Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 20 20
Portugal before EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 24 28
Portugal after EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 16 16
USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 18 22
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There are three countries, Germany, Portugal and the USA. They
trade a commodity, vegetable oil. Initially Germany has a tariff that
applies equally to all imported oil . If it imports oil despite the tariff, it
will buy initially from the USA, which offers the best price . This
appears in the second column, showing a low initial tariff. If the tariff
is high enough, however, then Germany will produce its own oil, as in
column 3 . Now if Germany enters into a free trade agreement with
Portugal, what are the welfare implications? If the tariff was initially
the higher, the welfare of Germany increases after the regional bloc is
created, since it replaces its domestic oil with a less expensive oil and
uses its domestic resources in more productive sectors . However, if
the tariff was initially as in column 3, after the free trade agreement
Germany shifts from American to Portuguese oil, i.e . from a low cost
to a higher cost producer . In this case, the free trade zone lowers
welfare .
Viner's point is that there are "trade creating" free trade zones, in
which the increase in imports by members from one another replaces
domestic production. These are desirable . However, free trade blocs
could also be "trade diverting" in the case that imports are diverted
from a lower cost source outside the bloc to other sources inside the
bloc which are less productive, but with more attractive prices after
the tariffs were selectively dropped .
The extra trade among the members of the trading bloc is,
generally, an improvement of welfare . The trade which is not
additional, but a diversion from efficient outside sources to less
efficient inside sources lowers welfare. If northern Europe is induced
by the entry of southern Europe to buy oil from Portugal rather than
an equivalent from the US, and the US source is more efficient but less
competitive after the tariffs are dropped in Europe, there has been a
welfare loss. Generally speaking Viner's approach evaluates free trade
zones by the extent to which more trade is created, rather than
existing trade diverted from one source to another .
Viner's original insight remains central to the analysis of prefer-
ential free trade zones. But, in practice, it misses an important aspect .
The increase size of the market can sometimes lead to more efficiency
and competitiveness. Even in the cases where Viner's analysis predicts
welfare losses, namely when the trade bloc diverts trade from outside
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sources to less competitive inside sources, welfare can still increase
with economies of scale . This can be explained simply in our numeri-
cal example. As Portugal expands its oil production due to its new
trade to Germany, it becomes more efficient . This appears in Table 2,
column 2 . After the tariffs were removed Portugal produces and
exports more oil and it becomes more competitive, reaching the US
level .
TRADE IS NOT DIVERTED WITH ECONOMIES OF SCALE
TABLE 2
Economies of scale can therefore have a major impact on trade
policies . We showed that they can check the negative trade diversion
effects of a trading bloc. We shall argue in what follows that they can
also limit another major negative effect of a trading bloc : the incent-
ives for large blocs with market power to impose tariffs on others .
What does the empirical evidence show? It is widely believed that
economies of scale were an important factor in the success of the
Treaty of Rome . Economies of scale were central to the success of the
European Common Market which was formed in 1958. While a
strong possibility for trade diversion existed a priori in the EC, in
reality huge inter-industry trade emerged in manufactures . The in-
crease in market size and the associated rationalization in production
led to efficiency gains which took precedence over possible trade
diversion . Krugman [14] discusses this issue in some detail, without
however offering a conceptual relation between economies of scale
and the economics of trading blocs . «Hopes for large benefits from
both the US-Canada free trade agreement and Europe 1992 rest
Cost of veg. oil
0
Tariffs
I 8 12
Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 20 20
Portugal before EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 24 28
Portugal after EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10 10
USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 18 22
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largely on an increase in competition and rationalization. In the North
American case, the estimate of Harris and Cox, who attempt to take
account of competitive/industrial organization effects, suggest a gain
for Canada from free trade that is about 4 times larger than those of
standard models . In Europe the widely cited and somewhat con-
troversial figure of 7 percent gain due to 1992 presented in the
Cechini Report Commission of the European Communities 1988 rests
primarily on estimates by Alisdair Smith and Anthony Venables of
gains from increased competition and rationalization- .
In practice, therefore, economies of scale can defeat trade
diversion losses, and transform these into gains. I shall also argue
below that they can also defeat the incentives for tariff wars between
blocs, so that the formation of trading blocs can become a parallel,
complementary effort towards the liberalization of world trade.
3 . - Trading Blocs with Economies of Scale
3 .1 Trade Inside and Between the Blocs
Although predictions are inherently dangerous in an area so
circumscribed by political action, our conclusion is that regional free
trade can have different effects on global markets and it should be to a
certain extent the choice of well informed and reasonable economic
agents which one will prevail .
Regional trading blocs based on traditional comparative advan-
tages will generally divert trade . They will also typically hinder the
prospects of global negotiations. In this case, as the bloc has more
market power than its parts, it has the incentive to impose larger
tariffs on the rest of the world. Regional blocs then develop incentives
for imposing tariffs against each other, and for engaging in trade
wars. This type of regional free trade zone works against global free
trade.
There is, however, an alternative . If the regional trade zones are
oriented to the expansion of trade based not on traditional compara-
tive advantages but rather on increased size and on the productive
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efficiency and competitiveness that comes with economies of scale,
matters could be quite different . In this latter case, the regional free
trade zones could unleash an appetite for further expansion of trade .
We shall argue that in this case the incentive for blocs to impose tariffs
against each other is reduced, and in fact can be defeated by the
economic incentives in favor of trade expansion which accompanies
economies of scale . The incentives are now for further expansion of
trade . The creation of trading blocs which are organized around
economies of scale is therefore part of a broader trend towards
increasingly open world markets .
3 .2 The Americas: Traditional Comparative Advantages
or Economies of Scale
A central issue in our argument is the pattern of trade inside the
blocs. This issue is of particular importance in an American free trade
zone. This is because of all the regions, the American area is the one
whose trade is currently based on traditional comparative advantages
and on the diversity between the traders' economic development
rather than on economies of scale .
The matter is not only one of economic reality : it is also one of
perceived economic reality . Both the European and the East Asian
countries perceive gains from trade as a matter of exploiting econ
omies of scale . The newly industrialized countries in Asia, and the
Japanese, have a dynamic vision of comparative advantages . Moving
up the ladder of comparative advantages in the production and trade
of skilled-labor manufactures, of consumer electronics, and of pro-
ducts based on specialized knowledge and on technological skill, are
widespread priorities .
By contrast, within the sphere of influence of the US, the vision of
trade based on traditional comparative advantages still prevails . It
permeates to a great extent the thinking about international trade at
the government level, at the international organization level, at the
academic, and even at the journalist level .
The European free trade zone is, to a certain extent, a zone of
equals . To encourage this equality, the introduction of free mobility of
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labor has been one of the first steps in the European market integr-
ation of 1992 .
The Americas, on the other hand, have the US as a hegemon, a
"hub" which concentrates on exporting manufactures and skill-intens-
ive goods to the "spokes" in exchange for their resources . The free
mobility of labor between - the hub and the spokes is an unspoken
issue . It has not even been contemplated in the American negotiations
for free trade . It has not been mentioned by any of the governments
concerned that labor could move freely between the free trade
partners, as it does in the EC region . In some cases, quite to the
contrary, the free trade agreement has been mentioned as a way to
limit the mobility of labor between the concerned countries, such as
Mexico and the US .
To the extent that labor remains a fixed input of production
within the countries of the American free trade zone, traditional
comparative advantages based on labor will be invoked as a founda
tion for policy . The concern is that an American free trade zone, if it
emerges, may reflect the historical patterns of trade between indus-
trial and developing regions, which is usually called North-South
trade .
3 .3 Traditional Comparative Advantages
and the Global Environment
Another reason for concern with respect to traditional compara-
tive advantages arises from the current focus on the environment.
Traditional comparative advantages emphasize the South's concentra
tion in the production and export of goods which deplete environ-
mental resources, such as wood pulp and cash crops which overuse
rain forests, or minerals whose combustion leads to the emission of
greenhouse gases . Recent work in the area of North-South trade with
environmental inputs to production (Chichilnisky [7], [8]) shows that
ill-defined patterns of property rights on forests, fisheries, and arable
land in developing countries may lead to a market-induced oversup-
ply of goods which are intensive in the use of these resources as
inputs, and to Pareto inefficient patterns of international trade. What
- W1r I III IN I I
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appears as comparative advantages may simply be a reflection of a
market failure in the developing countries . Social and private com-
parative advantages differ and social and private gains from trade may
also differ in these circumstances. Traditional tax policies, levying
duties on the use of such inputs in the South, may not work, and may
indeed lead to more extraction of the resource and more exports of
the resource-intensive commodity . Indeed, it is shown in Chichilnisky
[7], [8] that differences in property rights on inputs of production are
sufficient to explain the patterns of trade between nations . The global
environment is therefore another reason for being concerned with
traditional comparative advantages as a foundation for trade. Since
two thirds of the current exports from Latin America are resources,
and the main trade of Ecuador, Venezuela and Mexico with the US is
petroleum, this problem is very real . It is also very real with respect to
the trading in wood products which lead to the deforestation of the
remaining tropical forests, Amelung [l], Barbier et Al . [2], Binkley -
Vincent [3], Hyde - Neumann [11] . Replacing traditional comparative
advantages with economies of scale could be a necessary feature of a
program of sustainable development .
3 .4 Skilled Labor and External Economies of Scale
It seems desirable at this point to distinguish an important
difference between two types of economies of scale : internal to the
firm, or external to it . The former are simply a reflection that each
firm may be more efficient in the use of its inputs to production as the
level of its output increases . The firm's per unit costs decrease with
the level of output. Such economies of scale are typical of industries
which require large fixed costs, such as aerospace, airlines, and
communications networks . This type of increasing returns, called
internal, can lead to monopolistic competition or other forms of
limitations to market entry . As such, there is a loss to the consumer in
that the free market outcomes are typically not Pareto efficient.
There is a different type : external economies of scale . These also
lead to a decrease in per unit costs as the output expands, but they do
so at the level of the industry or of the country as a whole. Each firm's
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production function faces increasing cost per unit of output, i.e .
decreasing returns to scale, which assures competitive behavior .
However, as the industry as a whole expands, externalities are created
which lead to increased productivity for all the firms . A good example
is provided by the electronics industry. Each computer manufacturer
faces a rather competitive market . On the other hand, as the overall
level of output of the industry expands, knowledge about new tech-
nologies develops and this new knowledge, which is easily and rapidly
diffused across the industry, leads to lower costs for all . Just about any
industry which depends heavily on knowledge has this characteristic .
In reality, the factor which leads to increasing returns is the skill of the
labor force which embodies knowledge . Knowledge is typically
diffused and can be captured and imitated sooner or later, and there
are abundant examples in the software and hardware industry to
prove this point (2) . Knowledge creates skilled labor, and this in turn
leads to increasing returns to scale, which usually, although not
always, are external to the firm . Because of this skilled labor can
simultaneously lead to economies of scale, and to competitive
markets . The successful development experience of Korea, of Taiwan,
and more recently of the Asian Tigers, showns that export-led policies
based on skilled labor intensive goods, for example in consumer
electronics, is generally more successful than those intensive in the
use of inexpensive and uneducated labor . This point was developed
formally in Chichilnisky [4], [6], and more recently in terms of
development policies in Dadzie [10] .
In this paper we shall concentrate on external economies of scale,
which are closely, connected with production systems based on skilled
labor .
3 .5 Optimal Tariffs: Traditional Theory
We mentioned above that a large country will typically impose
tariffs so as to improve its terms of trade . In doing so it typically
(2) Microsoft's Windows excellent imitation of the Apple operating systems was
tested in the US courts and found without fault .
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introduces distortions in its production and consumption . Here we
shall show in a simple example how under traditional assumptions
there is a tariff that improves welfare, in the sense that the gains from
improved terms of trade exceed the losses from distortions . The
analysis is completely standard, see e.g. Krugman and Obsfelt [15],
but it is included here in order to highlight the differences which arise
in economies with increasing returns to scale . This is discussed in the
next section .
The analysis in this section relies on one assumption and one
simplification . Both are raised in the Appendix, which consider the
general case . The assumption here is that the supply and demand
curves of the economy are linear and exhibit decreasing returns to
scale, and that there are no major income effects . The simplification is
to neglect the impact of the tariff revenues on income; this is typically
done in textbooks, and will also be done in this section . It is however
explicitly analyzed in the Appendix .
We assume that the home country H has a demand curve with
equation :
where p is the domestic price of the good and' a supply curve :
Country H's demand for imports is the difference :
(3) D-Q=(a-e)-(b+f)P
Foreign export supply is also a straight line :
(Q *- D*) = g+hp,
where p, is the world price . The internal price in country H exceeds
the world price by the tariff:
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(a - e) - (b + f) x (p,,, + t) = q + hpw
Solving equation (6) for t = 0 gives pf, the world price that would
prevail without tariffs . Then a tariff t alters the internal price to :
p=pf+th/(b+f+h)
and the world price to :
pu,= pf - t(b + 1)1(b + f + h)
Note that if the parameters a, e, b, h and f are all positive, then :
implying that the tariff raises the internal price p and lowers the world
price p,.
It is immediate to show that, under these conditions, it is always
possible to find a tariff t that increases the country's welfare . Let ql
and dl be the free trade levels of consumption and production . Since
the internal price is higher after the tariff, domestic supply rises from
ql to q2 and demand falls from dl to d2 :
(10)
and :
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In a world equilibrium imports must equal exports :
pf < P and pw > pf
=ql +tfh/(b+f+h)
(11) d2 =d l -tbh/(b+f+h)
The gain in welfare from a lower world price is the area of the
rectangle in Graph 1, the fall in the price multiplied by the level of
imports after the tariff:
(12) gain in welfare = (d2 -q2 ) x t(b+f)/(b+f+h) =
t x (di- qi) x (b+))/ (b+f+ h) - (t)2 x h (b+ p2 / (b+f+ h)2
178
P
Pf
Pw
P
Graciela Chichilnisky
GAINS AND LOSSES FROM TARIFFS:
TRADITIONAL CASE
The net effect on welfare is therefore :
(14)
	
gain - loss = t x U - (t)2 x V
(13) loss in welfare = (1/2) x (q2 - ql ) x (P - pf) +
+ (1/2) x (di-d2) x (p-pf)=(t)2 x (b+ f) x h2/2 (b+f+ h)2
GRAPH 1
W q
The loss from distorted consumption is the sum of the areas of
the two triangles in Graph 3:
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where U and V are constants . The net effect is the sum of a positive
number times the tariff rate and a negative number times the square
of the tariff rate . It follows that when the tariff is sufficiently small the
net effect must be positive, since tz is smaller than t, for t near zero .
This establishes that, when supply and demand, income effects of the
tariff income are neglected and are linear and tariffs are small, there
exists a positive tariff which increases the welfare of the country
beyond that which can be obtained under free trade .
The size of the country matters . If the importing country is small,
then foreign supply is highly elastic i.e . h is very large, so from (8) we
verify that the tariff has little or no effect on world prices p, while
raising domestic prices P almost one-to-one.
3.6 Optimal Tariffs with Economies of Scale
The argument in the previous section shows that a large country
is better off by imposing tariffs than it is under free trade . This
proposition holds under traditional conditions, one of which is that
the supply of goods should increase with prices across market equilib-
ria . In our example, this is formalized by the parameters in the supply
function in equation (2), which is upward sloping . However, this
assumption ceases to be valid when the economy has economies of
scale . In such economies the larger the output the lower the costs,
and therefore, in principle, the lower the prices . Then f < 0 in
equation (8), which in turn can lead to a negative welfare gain from
the tariff from equation (12).
A good example of this phenomenon is provided by the electro-
nics industry, for example computer hardware . The last fifteen years
have seen a dramatic decrease in prices together with a dramatic
expansion of output of computer hardware. This occurs because the
expansion in output leads to rationalization and the corresponding
increased efficiency in production . In the hardware industry this takes
the form of technological change which improves productive effici-
ency and lowers the costs of the industry as a whole. Even though a
technological breakthrough may in principle be patented, and there-
fore could be captured by one firm with the corresponding increase in
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its market power and deviation from competitive behavior, in practice
the computer industry is very competitive . This is because the know-
ledge which drives the technological innovation in this industry is
easily diffused .
A standard textbook analysis of such economies of scale is for
example Nicholson [20], pages 252-5, who documents that most
studies of long-run cost curves have found that average costs are
decreasing up to a point and then constant . Examples provided are
agriculture, electricity generation, railroads, and commercial banking,
all activities which are broadly associated with economic develop-
ment. The same textbook analysis explains how competitive markets
can lead to a negative association of quantities and prices across
equilibria . This was the content of the famous debate in the 1920's
between J.H . Clapham, A.C. Pigou and D.H. Roberston, which was
resolved positively, and which appeared in the Economic Journal
between 1922 and 1924 (3) . Chichilnisky and Heal [5] have discussed
in some detail the policy implications of international trade in econ-
omies with increasing returns to scale in a report on trade policies in
the 1980's to the Secretary General of UNCTAD, and they reach
similar conclusions .
We shall now show how the analysis of optimal tariffs in the last
section breaks down when there are increasing returns to scale . In
such economies there may be no gains from imposing tariffs, even if
the country is large, and has substantial market power. The optimal
tariff theorem no longer holds . We shall now explain how this
happens in a concrete case.
It is useful to remind ourselves how tariffs increase welfare in the
economy of the previous section . Tariffs increase welfare by lowering
the world prices p,,, : this was seen in equation (7) . The country's terms
of trade thus improve after the tariff. It imports fewer lower cost
goods from the rest of the world. The welfare gains were computed in
equation (12) : these depend crucially on the fact that, after the tariff,
the consumers pay lower prices for the goods they import .
However, this argument no longer holds with economies of scale .
With economies of scale the world price may increase rather than
(3) See NICHOLSON [20], p. 332.
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decrease after the tariff. The welfare gains from tariffs are the drop in
world prices times the quantity imported . But if the world price
increases, the gains are transformed into losses .
The possibility that after a tariff the terms of trade deteriorate for
the country was studied in Lerner [16] and Metzler [ 19] . They argue
mostly in terms of income effects . A similar phenomenon occurs in
our economy, but due to different causes . In contrast with the
economy of the previous section, the parameter f in equation (8) is
now negative rather than positive ; this means that across equilibria
the prices drop as quantities increase, or otherwise said, prices
increase when quantities drop. If the tariff decreases the quantity
produced and traded, this will lower the productive efficiency of the
economy . Costs increase and therefore prices increase too . The tariff
defeats the gains from rationalization in production produced by the
larger market size . This is represented in Graph 2 . It shows a negative
correlation between market clearing prices and the quantity of goods
sold at an equilibrium, and how this leads to an increase in the world
prices after the tariff, corresponding to a decrease in output .
We saw that after the tariff, the world price pu, can be higher
rather than lower as it is in the traditional case with decreasing
returns to scale . The terms of trade for the country are therefore
worse after the tariff. Consumers in the country are worse off: the
price of their imports have increased. All of this is formally reflected in
the systems of equations presented above . In equation (7) the para-
meter f describing the relation between supply and prices, which was
previously positive, is now negative . In practical terms the following
conditions are sufficient for the world price to increase rather than
decrease after the tariff:
(15) b<IfI<h
f<0,b,h>0
Conditions (15) are satisfied under a variety of circumstances . For
example (15) holds when foreign export supply increases with, and is
highly responsive to, prices (h > 0 and large), a resonable assumption
for the world, when the country has increasing returns to scale (f < 0)
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LOSSES FROM TARIFFS WITH ECONOMIES OF SCALE
P
AFTER THE TARIFF, THE WORLD PRICE p, INCREASES
DUE TO ECONOMIES OF SCALE
D-S
International market
4
GwH 2
and the quantity produced is more responsive to price than is the
demand (b > 0, b <
	
I f I ) .
The main condition is the existence of economies of scale in the
economy (f < 0). Under these conditions, the optimal tariff theorem is
no longer true, as the countries may have no economic incentive to
impose tariffs on others : they lose by restricting trade .
Consumer electronics, semiconductors, software production,
banking and financial services, and just about any sector whose
productivity depends mostly on knowledge and information have
these characteristics . Software production is today actively developed
in India as an export business. It is a sector which is simultaneously
labor intensive and subject to informational economies of scale . As
already discussed, the remarkable economic development of the
Asian Tigers over the last fifteen years profited from the expansion of
their international trade of skilled-labor intensive products such as
consumer electronics . This sector is simultaneously labor intensive
and subject to informational economies of scale .
All the arguments just presented hold equally for countries or for
trading blocs . To the extent that sectors with economies of scale
expand within the free trade zone, the zone itself loses its economic
incentives to use its market power to restrict trade and wage tariff
wars against others .
4 . - Conclusions
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We have argued that the formation of trading blocs typically
harms the global liberalization of markets when the blocs are them-
selves organized under the principle of traditional comparative advan
tages . Under these conditions, the larger the market power of the bloc
the greater its incentives to impose tariffs on others . Protectionism
emerges from the increased market power of the traders .
Relation can lead to a tariff war between the blocs. Furthermore
under traditional assumptions, the larger country wins the tariff ware.
Therefore the larger the trading bloc, the more likely it is to impose
tariffs and to win a trade war .
Trading blocs of this nature have no economic incentive to favor
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the GATT negotiations . They are better off with tariffs than with free
trade . Indeed, the economic incentives of such trading blocs are
contrary to the GATT's intentions. We argued that, to a certain extent,
this explains the floundering of the GATT negotiations .
We discussed the example of the EC bloc in contrast with NAFTA
or with an eventual American free trade zone . The empirical evidence
suggests that the EC trading bloc benefited from increasing returns to
scale .
NAFTA, and any eventual America free trading bloc, emerged as
a strategic response to the increased market power of the European
trading bloc . By contrast with the EC trading bloc, the emerging
NAFTA appears to be organizing under the traditional theory of
comparative advantage .
The lack of any provision for the mobility of labor between the
countries of the region reinforces this trend. NAFTA does not contem-
plate the mobility of labor between Mexico and the US. The lack of
labor mobility tends to lock-in the traditional comparative advantages
between the countries within the area. Their trading on the basis of
comparative advantages within bloc will create incentives for trade
wars between the blocs.
A different scenario contemplates a NAFTA organized around
economies of scale . Example for such scenarios include the Indian
software trade, and the Asian Tigers' specialization in consumer
electronics . Typically, electronic-based industries have increasing
returns derived from the creation and diffusion of knowledge as
output expands . This leads to rationalization in production and to
increased efficiency and thus lower costs . The expansion of output is
accompanied by lower rather than higher prices . From the point of
view of the exporter, these markets are less likely to be protected
because the importer, having increasing returns to scale in this
industry, has less incentives to rely on tariffs than it does in other
industries with decreasing returns . With increasing returns, tariffs
decrease trade and can increase world prices, thus decreasing the
welfare of the importing country. Economies of scale produce incent-
ives to expand trade.
We formalized this issue by showing that economies of scale can
defeat the standard result of optimal tariffs . While under traditional
fs than with free
-ading blocs are
a certain extent,
ns .
rast with NAFTA
ipirical evidence
!asing returns to
loc, emerged as
>f the European
:, the emerging
Tonal theory of
or between the
)es not contem-
JS. The lack of
tive advantages
on the basis of
itives for trade
anized around
.ide the Indian
. in consumer
the increasing
knowledge as
uction and to
>n of output is
a the point of
be protected
scale in this
does in other
eturns, tariffs
ecreasing the
oduce incent-
s of scale can
.er traditional
Traditional Comparative Advantages vs . etc.
	
185
conditions, a trading bloc is always better off with tariffs than it is with
free trade, we showed that with increasing returns to scale this is no
longer true . Tariffs decrease the size of the market, and therefore
decrease productive efficiency in economies with increasing returns .
This decrease in efficiency leads to increased rather than lower world
prices, and the main purpose of the tariff, which is to improve the
countries' terms of trade, is defeated. Under these conditions trading
blocs are better off with free trade, and with the corresponding
expanded markets, than they are with tariffs . To the extent that
NAFTA organizes itself around economies of scale in the international
trade within the region, the incentives for a trade war between NAFTA
and the EC are mitigated .
It seems useful to remind ourselves that the choice of products
and of technology are to a large extent the subject of policy . They
need in no way interfere with market efficiency . The first welfare
theorem about the efficiency of competitive markets applies to a
market with given technologies and with given products . The theorem
does not explain how different technologies or products arise : it
proves that once technologies and products are given, competitive
markets lead .to Pareto efficiency . Once the product mix and the
technologies are chosen the market can operate efficiently . This
implies that the organizing principles within the blocs - traditional
comparative advantages or economies of scale - are, to a great
extent, a matter of policy choice . Choosing different trade policies, for
example, choosing technologies and the product mix, can be achieved
without market distortions or loss of market efficiency . This point was
already made by Meade [18] several years ago .
The emergence of an American trading bloc which reinforces the
current tendency towards the exploitation of traditional comparative
advantages is a source of concern . It has been argued Chichilnisky
[4], [5], [6] that export-led policies based on (unskilled) labor inten-
sive products can defeat the goals of development and trade by
depressing the country's terms of trade and overall consumption .
Trade between the countries of the Americas is organized today
around traditional comparative advantages: labor and resource inten-
sive exports from the South and capital and skill-intensive exports
from the North . If the emergence of an America free trade zone is
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based on similar principles, then not only may this continue a
depressing growth trend in Latin America, but in addition it could
create or reinforce incentives against the global liberalization of free
trade.
We have argued that another reason to avoid trade policies
between the countries of the Americas based on traditional compara-
tive advantages is that they tend to deplete environmental assets such
as forests, fisheries or fertile land, and overuse minerals which are
exported by the developing countries to the North. Some of these
minerals are the source of potentially dangerous C02 emissions.
Petroleum exported from Mexico, Ecuador and Venezuela to the USA
fits this description . Indeed, any concept of sustainable development
requires a rethinking of trade policies away from those based on
comparative advantages . This general premise is particularly well
suited to the NAFTA, and to the Americas as a whole, since two thirds
of Latin American exports today are resources.
The main point of this paper is that the characteristics of trading
policies within the trading blocs can determine the extent to which the
blocs will favor or harm the global negotiations towards free trade.
Trading policies based on comparative advantages are generally nega-
tive towards GATT. We argued that trading policies based on econ-
omies of scale could have the positive effect towards global free trade :
they could mitigate the economic incentive of tariffs and trade
restriction in favor of an expansion of world trade. The emergence of
such blocs could advance in tandem with the global liberalization of
world trade .
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APPENDIX
1 . - Trading Blocs with Increasing Returns to Scale
This appendix develops an international trade model and proves
formally the propositions on customs unions stated in the body of the
paper .
The model presented here extends the North-South model intro-
duced in Chichilnisky [4], [5], [6], to the case of economies which
trade goods produced under conditions of increasing returns to scale,
and proves formally the proposition that with increasing returns to
scale, large countries can achieve higher welfare levels with free trade
than with tariffs. This model consider Cobb-Douglas production func-
tions, and it assumes that there exist economies of scale in production
which are external to the firm, such as in the example of the
electronic industry discussed in the text .
The model describes two countries, 1 and 2, producing and
trading two goods B (basic goods) and I (industrial goods) with each
other; these goods are produced using two inputs, labor L and capital,
K. The economies of the two countries are competitive, so that in
each country prices are taken as given by consumers and producers .
Producers maximize profits, and consumers maximize utility subject
of their budget constraints . Walras' law is satisfied, so that the value
of the excess demand is equal to zero . At an equilibrium all markets,
for goods and for factors, clear .
The increasing returns to scale considered here are "external" to
the firm as in the example of parts of the electronics industry
discussed in the text . This means that in the production functions,
formalized below, there exists a parameter denoted y which increases
with the level of output of the economy . As the outputs of the
economy expand, the production function varies, formalizing the
notion that factors are more productive at higher levels of aggregate
output . However, the firm takes this parameter y as given - this is
the assumption that the increasing returns are external to the firm.
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For each given value of the parameter y the firm has constant returns
to scale . The firms are therefore competitive, and in particular zero
profits are achieved at an equilibrium .
Consider the model of one country first . The production functions
are :
(16) Bs = y Li Ki
-«
Is =
y L~ K2 -a
where a, R, E (0, 1), y is a positive parameter, Ll and KI are the inputs
of labor and capital in the B sector, and I2 and K2 the inputs of labor
and capital in the I sector . The total amount of labor and capital in the
economy are LS and Ks respectively . Prices are pB and pr ; we assume
that I is the numeraire so that : .
Factor prices are denoted as usual : w for wages and r for rental
on capital . We shall assume for simplicity that the demand for basic
goods at an equilibrium is known:
(18) Bd = Bd
so that by Walras' law the demand for industrial goods in equilibrium
is given by:
(19) Id = (WLS + r KS - PB Bd)
because of zero profits . More general demand functions than those
postulated in (18) can be given without a major effect on the results,
see for example the various forms of demand functions utilized in
Chichilnisky [6] . Indicating the equilibrium level of exports by XB
and the equilibrium level of imports by ki'*, the model of the world
economy is formalized by the following equilibrium conditions :
(20)
2 . - Solving the Model
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paBs*+I*=w*L*+rK*
(zero profits)
K*=KS=K1 +K2
(capital market clears)
L*=Ls=Ll +L2
(labor market clears)
BS*=Bd*+ XB*
(B market clears)
Id* = Is* + Xa*
(I market clears)
The model for the world economy consists of two countries,
indicated with the indices 1 and 2, each specified as above . To solve
the model, there are therefore five prices to be determined: the "terms
of trade" PB, and two factor prices in each country: w and r . The
quantities to be determined in an equilibrium are : the use of factors in
each sector of each country: Kl , K2 , LI , L2, the outputs of the two
goods BS and Is , and the corresponding parameter y determining the
external economies of scale, the exports and imports of each of the
two goods in each of the two countries, XB and Xd*, and the demand
for each good in each country : Bd* Id* . There is a total of twenty seven
variables to be determined endogenously, including all prices and
quantities in all markets and both countries .
In the following proposition 1 we shall prove that all of these
variables can be determined once the variable giving the terms of
trade in equilibrium pB is known. Furthermore we shall prove that
there exists one "resolving equation" which determines the equilib-
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rium value of the terms of trade as a function of all the exogenous
parameters of the model, of which there are six in each country: a, (3,
a, Bd*, Ls and Ks , and a total of twelve in the world economy.
3 . - The Effects of a Tariff on the Terms of Trade
Proposition 1: if the importing country 1 has external economies
of scale ;
y=7(B)=B, 6> 1
and the foreign supply is highly elastic (aXB/a PB) > 0 and very
large then no tariff can increase the welfare of the country relative to
that which the country can achieve under free trade.
Proof: consider a world economy with two countries defined as in
equations (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) . We shall now solve the model by
finding an explicit expression for the equilibrium terms of trade pB* in
the world economy . This consists of writing the market clearing
conditions in the B market, exports equal imports, and expressing it
as a function of one variable : pB. From the terms of trade in
equilibrium, we show that all other endogenous variables can be
found. We shall use the indices 1 and 2 to distinguish the parameters
of the two countries . Note first that we have given no specification of
demand or supply behavior outside of an equilibrium ; in particular,
there is no information for carrying out stability analysis . Since the
model has constant returns to scale, profit maximising supply func-
tions are, as is standard, undefined . As is standard in models with
constant returns to scale, we derive the equilibrium relations between
supplies and prices from the condition of full employment of factors
together with an equilibrium condition which incorporates the extern-
al economies of scale .
Denote :
h - L, K,
12 = L2 K2
all the exogenous
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(21) w = Ya (Li / Kl )'-1 pB = Yali -1 PB
r = Y (1 - a) 1T PB
w=YM-1
r= Y( 1 - R) 1R
so that :
(22)
and in particular :
(23)
Our next step is to define an equation (called the "resolving
equation" and denoted F = 0) which yield the equilibrium value of the
terms of trade pB as a function of all the exogenous parameters of the
model of which there are 12 as listed above, and from which all other
endogenous variables at equilibrium are explicitly computed .
Indicating logarithms with the symbol "' the four equations in
(21) can be rewritten as :
(24) w=(a-1)11+a,+pa+Y
r=all+(1=a)+pB+y
w=(R - 1)12+ p+ 'Y
r=(312+(1-(3)+'Y
so that:
Traditional Comparative Advantages vs . etc. 191
w
[ (1
a a) 1 w
[(1 ¢
_ R) 111 and- = 12
1 1 =
[(1
- R) al 12[(3(1 - a)]
(25) (a-1)11+&+pB=(~-1)12+R
all +(1=a)+pB=P12+(1-R)
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or equivalently :
(26) (a-1)h+(1=R)12=R-PB-oc
all -(312=(1-R)-PB- (1-a)
Solving for 1 1 , 12 we obtain :
f(R - PB-a) (-R) - (1-R) f(1=R)-PB -(1-a)]
(27) 11 =
[R-a]
and:
ROC- 1) U1=R)-PB-(1-a)]-[(R-PB-a)a]](28) 12 =
and:
where:
and:
From (27) and (28) we obtain :
[R-«]
(29) h = + A
(R - a)
12= PB +B
(R - a)
A= R)-(1
- R)[(1=R)-(1- ac)]]
(R - a)
B= [a - 1)[(1-R)-(1-a)]-a(R
- a)
(R-a)
A>0 and B<0 if 0 <a
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Therefore :
(30) 1 1 = eAPB
and:
(31)
or :
and:
(32)
so that :
or :
Now:
12 = e PB/(P-«)
LS -L1)_
>LS-L1 =12 (Ks- Ki)
KS-K,
L1=Ls-12 (Ks- K1)
11 = L1/K1 > L1 11 K1
Ls - 12 (KS - K1) = 11 Kl
(33) K1 (11 - 12) = Ls- 12 KS > K1 = (Ls- 12 KS) / (11-12)
From (31) (32) (33) we obtain :
(34) K1 =
(Ls
- 12 Ks)
(11 - 12)
and:
(35) L1 =
(11) (LS - 12 KS)
(11 - 12)
OMME
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from which together with (30) we obtain the levels of supply of labor
and capital used in each sector, at an equilibrium as a function of the
equilibrium level of the relative price of B:
eA Ls eA eB 1/(P-M)(36) L i = (eA _ B) - (eA _ B) Ks PB
and :
(37)	K i = eAe Ls B Pa0'-P _
ea
(eA _ eB) Ks
From (16) (36) we obtain the quantity ofB and I produced at each
level of relative prices, pB. Now taking y = 1, we denote these as ~
(pB) and * (pB) respectively . Therefore from (16) we obtain the
equilibrium level of outputs as a function of equilibrium prices :
(38) Bs = Y~ (PB)
and :
Note that this does not fully express output as an explicit function
of equilibrium prices because y = y (B) . In order to obtain outputs as
explicit functions of equilibrium prices we must also find out the
equilibrium value of y = y* (B), which is "fixed point" problem, since
y depends on B and B depends on y . We solve this as follows .
The economy has increasing returns which are external to the
firm, and the parameter y increases with the level of output of B and
I:
(40)
Is = Y* (PB)
At an equilibrium equations (38) and (39) must be satisfied
simultaneously, i.e . :
Y = LY - ~ (PBAa
= YQ ~ (PB)6 or yl-6 = ~ (PB)Q
supply of labor
function of the
-oduced at each
note these as (~
we obtain the
um prices :
xplicit function
lain outputs as
find out the
problem, since
s follows .
"xternal to the
utput of B and
;t be satisfied
so that :
Therefore at an equilibrium from (38) we obtain a relation
between the outputs of B and I, and pB:
(41)
so that when BS = ~ (pB)a+'ic'-a> decreases with pB across equilibria,
since ~ (pB) is an increasing function of pB for each fixed 7, see Graph
3 .
If a-+1, 0 --" - oo .
To solve the model we now consider the market clearing condi-
tion in B . At a world equilibrium, the B market must clear so that:
(42)
	
Bd'' (PB + t) - Bs'' (PB + t) = Bs .2 (PB) - Bd,2 (pB)
or :
Note that :
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Y = ~ (ha)'('-6)
BS = (PB)a+vi(1 -a)
IS = (PB)a+I/(l-Q)
when 6>1,0=6+1/1-6<0
F(PB, t)=Bd, ' (pB+ t) - Bs '' (pB + t) -
Bs'2
(PB) +
Bd,2
(PB) = 0
From (18) (19) (21) (30) and (41), equation (42) is a function of the
variable pB alone, which we call a reduced form "resolving" equation
for this model. Solving this equation gives the equilibrium values ofpB
from where all other variables can be computed as shown above . The
model is thus solved .
We may now study the changes in the terms of trade as a function
of the tariff t. By the implicit function theorem:
(43) apBla t
- a Flat
=
a FlapB
- ( a (Bd.i - Bs,l/_ a (PB + t)
Bd. 'la (PB+t)+ aBd.2/apB- aBs.'/a(PB+t)- aBs,2/a pB
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EACH FIRM FACES AN UPWARD COST CURVE.
THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE FACES A DOWNWARD COST CURVE
DUE TO EXTERNAL ECONOMIES OF SCALE
Pe
GRAPH 3
By the assumptions on demand for B, if 6i > 1, then aBs, 'l a (pB
+ t) < 0 and therefore the numerator of (43) is negative . The
denominator is also negative, so that 8 pB/ a t > 0. As the tariff t
increases, pB also increases . The terms of trade of the country
decrease, since it imports B and must now pay more for it, as we
wished to prove.
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